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Maroeconomic  Adjustn  nt
and Growth
How has the labor market responded to changes  of expanding sectors, which suggests less than
in macroeconomic conditions and related gov-  perfect labor mobility.
cmment policies?  (In particular, is the labor
market a significant obstacle to successful  Traditional methods of wage support-
adjustment policies?)  And to what extent has  such as minimum wage policies and nonwage
govemment intervention affected the microecon-  cost regulations (including fringe benefits,
omic functioning of the labor market?  medical insurance, and social security contribu-
tions) - have generally become less important
Fallon and Riveros reviewed the recent  in the last two decades. Where effective mini-
experience of 23 developing countries to answer  mum wage policic  . exist, they have the expected
those two questions.  Their conclusions:  distortionary effects.
Geographical immobility of unskilled or  Wage diiferences between the public and
clerical workers does not seem to hinder adjust-  private sectors - particularly in sub-Saharan
ment.  Labor is increasingly deployed in non-  Africa - have continued to widen, and the
tradables and import-competing sectors, how-  efficiency of the public sector has declined as a
ever, and problems of mobility between  result.
tradables and nontradables are reported. In
addition, shortages of trained manpower are  Job security regulations may be an obstacle
common in most countries.  Whether segmenta-  to structural adjustment programs insofar as they
tion of the urban labor market causes problems  hinder the release of labor from contracting
is an issue that deserves further study.  sectors. Regulations of this kind could become
more commonplace as governments seek to
There is little evidence of wage resistance  offset the job-reducing effects of recession, but
where wage indexation is not institutionalized,  no clear intemational trend in this direction has
but this subject bears further investigation.  been discemed.
Wage differences have tended to widen in favor
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assistance.I.  Introduction
The  macroeconomics  of structural  adjustment  confers  a central  role  to
18bor  market  response,  since  the  achievement  of  a real  devaluation  demands
both real  wage flexibility  and  intersectoral  labor  mobility. However,  it is
usually  argued  that  the  effectiveness  of expenditure  switching  and  expenditure
reduction  policies  is  mitigated  by obstacles  in the  labor  market. These
obstacles  result  from  segmentation,  job  security  regulations,  wage indexation,
aggressive  minimum  wage  practices  and  other  institutional  sources  of
rigidities.  Hence,  a central  issue  in  applied  research  is  to determine  how
influential  are  economic  forces  as  opposed  to institutional  forces  in
affecting  labor  market  adjustment.
Although  several  analytical  models  single  out  the  likely  important
effect  of distortions  and institutions  in  terms  of a costly  adjustment
process,  little  recent  empirical  evidence  is available  for  LDCs.  In fact,
previous  research  work  has dealt  with  wage indexation,  minimum  wages  policies,
distortive  non-wage  costs  and  institutionally  segmented  labor  markets  in a
theoretical  perspective  [see,  for  instance,  Fischer  (1984),  Edwards  (1988),
Lal (1985),  Lopez  and  Riveros  (1989)]. However,  and  in spite  of their
potential  importance  in  assessing  the  stylized  facts  of labor  market
perforwAnce  in the  adjustment,  comparative  studies  of recent  LDCs'  experience
in  the  framework  of imperfect  labor  markets  are  all  but  abundant.
This  paper  reviews  the  recent  experience  of 23 LDCs'  labor  markets  on
the  basis  of ad  hoc country  studies  prepared  for  the  World  Bank.l. The aim  is
to provide  a synthesis  of the  main conclusions  in  light  of the  major
implications  of standard  macroeconomic  models. Given  the  diversity  both in
labor  market  structure  and in  recent  economic  experience  among  LDCs,  this
review  is  necessarily  selective  in its  coverage  and  concentrates  upon  two  main
ques'ions  as its  main focus:-2-
(a)  How  has the  labor  market  responded  to changes  in  macroeconomic
conditions  and  to related  government  policies? In particular,  does
the  labor  market  present  a significant  obstacle  to "successful"
adjustment  policies?
(b)  To  what extent  has  government  intervention  affected  the  microeconomic
functioning  of the  labor  market?
The  plan of the  paper  is as follows. In section  2  we briefly  review
the  main  macroeconomic  trends  experienced  by the  set  of countries  over  the
19709  and  first  half of the  19809. Section  3  explores  some  theoretical
relationships  betwee&z.  changes  in  domestic  policies  and  the  external
environment  upon  the  laboi  market. In section  4,  we look  at the  labor  market
trends  that  have actually  occurred  and  relate  these  as far  as  possible  to the
material  provided  by the  country  studies. In Section  5,  we turn  to some
institutional  aspects  of  LDCs'  labor  markets. Finally,  a summary  and
conclusions  appear  as section  6.
2.  The  Maccroeconomic  Scenario
The  growth  performance  of  nearly  all  the  countries  in  our sample  has
deteriorated  significantly  since  1980.  The  annual  average  growth  rate  of GDP,
as shown  in  Table  1,  was generally  lower  between  1980  and  1986  than  during
earlier  periods  in all  countries  except  India  and  Pakistan. Most  LDCs in fact
started  to run  into  difficulties  of one  kind  or another  following  the  slowdown
in  the  world  economy  after  1973.  In sub-Saharan  Africa,  for  example,  exports
grew  on average  at only  1.1Z  p.a.  during  the  1970s  as  compared  with an average
rate  of over  6Z  during  the  previous  decade. This  largely  reflected  a rather
poor  growth  performance  of the  agricultural  sector  arising  from  a combination
of terms  of trade  changes,  an overvalued  exchange  rate,  low  agricultural
pricing  policies  and  often  inadequate  levels  of  public  investment  in ruralareas. Correspondingly,  GDP in  sub-Saharan  Africa  grew  more slowly  during  the
1970's  as compared  to the  1960's. Similarly,  Latin  American  countries  were
characterized  in the  1970's  by negative  terms  of trade  changes  and  use  of
internal  policies  leading  to  pronounced  overvaluation,  heavy  indebtedness  and
severe  macro imbalances.  In  LDCs as a  whole,  the  1970's  was a period  of
slower  growth  than  the  1960's,  although  the  slowdown  was less  pronounced  in
South  Asia and  Latin  America  than in  sub-Saharan  Africa. Growth  rates
actually  increased  in  East  Asia  and  the  Pacific.
The secular  slowdown  in the  growth  rates  of less-developed  countries
since  the  mid-1960's  may  be partly  attributed  to  an increased  tendency  to
concentrate  resources  in often  inefficiently  managed  state  owned  enterprises,
and  to a gradual  exhaustion  of  opportunities  for  import  substitution.
Moreover,  the  high  degree  of government  intervention  across  the  economy,
coupled  with an enlarged  public  sector,  fueled  persistent  inflation  and  caused
lack  of flexibility  to respond  to a  changing  international  environment.  Most
non-oil  exporting  LDC's  also  suffered  a downturn  following  the  oil  price
increase  of 1973.  The  much sharper  slowdown  observed  since  1980  was,  however,
much  more  closely  related  to the  policy  responses  forced  by a rapidly
worsening  balance  of payments  situation. In general,  the  main policy  response
has  been to further  limit  imports,  with generally  adverse  effects  upon  both
domestic  investment  and  the  availability  of intermediate  inputs. Hence,
progress  in  stabilization-cum-structural  adjustment  policies  has  been  poor,
especially  in  the  areas  of deregulation  and  fiscal  deficits. Private
investment  has also  been discouraged  in  some  countries  by a tightening  of
credit  availability  to the  private  sector  and  crowding  out  resulting  from
public  sector  policies. Most countries  have  had,  however,  markedly  less
success  in reducing  public  sector  deficits,  partly  because  of difficulties  in
reducing  real  current  and  social  expenditures  and  partly  because  of reduced-4-
real  revenues. The  brunt  of reduced  public  expenditure  has  therefore  tended
to fall  upon  public  investment.
In 1980  almost  all  of our  countries  possessed  a current  account
deficit  (Table  1),  the  exceptions  being  the  net  oil  exporters,  Nigeria  and
Indonesia,  who  were enjoying  the  effect  of the  1979  oil  price  hike  at this
time. The  current  account  position  of these  two  countries  deteriorated  very
seriously  in later  years. Furthermore,  in  more than  one  third  of our
countries,  the  current  account  position  suffered  further  deterioration  in
1986.
There  were three  main  causes  of generally  worsening  current  account
deficits  in  most LDCs.  The  first  of these  was of course  the  oil  price
increase  of 1979  referred  to above. The  second  was that  recessionary
tendencies  among  the  developed  countries  led  to a fall  in  demand  for  primary
products  and  a consequent  decline  in their  terms  of trade. This  problem  was
further  exacerbated  by increased  protectionism  on the  part  of the  developed
countries  which reduced  access  to their  domestic  markets. The  third  cause  of
growing  deficits  stemmed  from  increased  foreign  borrowing  during  the  1970's
which  was partly  enhanced  by  policy-induced  overvaluation.  Before  1980,  real
foreign  interest  ra.es  had  been  low  or even  negative. Restrictive  monetary
policies  in  the  developed  world  from  1980  onwards  sharply  reversed  this
position  and  made it  more difficult  for  indebted  developing  countries  to
service  their  debts. Foreign  borrowing  later  became  a much less  available
source  of financing  after  1982  as the  debt  crisis  intensified  and  the  United
States  developed  its  own rather  severe  current  account  deficit.
The  terms  of trade  indices  for  1970,  1980  and  1986  are  shown  for  each
country  in Table  2.  In every  country  except  India  and  South  Korea  - both
significant  exporters  of manufactured  goods,  the index  declined  between  1980
and  1986. Country-by-country  experience  varied  considerably.  however,  during5-
the  1970's  as a  whole,  depending  upon  the  composition  of imports  and  exports
by commodity. The  oil  producers  thus  experienced  a sharp  iuprovemenw  in their
terms of trade over the 1970's,  while Chile and Zambia --  countries whose mairn
export,  copper,  has  experienced  a  chronic  fall  in  world  demand  --  suffered  a
correspondingly  spectacular  fall .a  their  terms  of trade. Nevertheless,
although  country  experience  varied uring  the  1970's,  it is  clear  that  between
1980  and  1986,  most of the  countri6s  ir,  our  sample  found  that  a given  export
volume  financed  less  imports  than  before.
Table  2 also chows  a sharp  contrast  in the  behavior  of country
indebtedness  over time. Among  the  African  countries,  total  medium  and long
term  debt  grew  relative  to exports,  Sudan,  Tanzania  and  Zambia  being  the  most
serious  examples. In  Asia,  we observe  the  opposite  trend  during  the  1970s,
although  the  debt/export  ratio  increased  in  all  countries  exept  South  Korea
between  1980  and  1987.  The  debt/export  ratio  also  rose  in  all  of our  Latin
American  countries.  It does  not  necessarily  follow,  however,  that  a  high
debt/export  ratio  implies  a  high ratio  of debt  service  to exports. The
poorest  countries  such  as  Kenya,  India  and  Sudan  accumulated  much debt  via
concessional  borrowing  in the  form  of low-interest,  long-term  loans,  while
countries  with  higher  GDP  per  capita  such  as  Argentina  and  Chile  typically
faced  twice  the  interest  rate  and  half the  pay-back  period.  Half of our
countries  also  rescheduled  their  debt  between  1975  and  1984.  For  these
reasons,  the  ratio  of debt  service  to debt  varied  considerably  among  countries
while  the  two  ratios  sometimes  moved  in  opposite  directions  between  1970  and
1987.  Thus,  although  Egypt,  Mexico  and  Peru  experienced  an increase  in  their
debt/export  ratios  over  the  period  as a  whole,  their  debt  service  ratios
actually  fell. Nevertheless  the  debt  service  ratios  do confirm  the  conclusion
that  indebtedness  was,  with  the  exception  of the  Philippines,  a less  serious
problem  for  the  Asian  countries  by the  early  1980's  than  it  was a  decade
earlier.-6-
It is convenient  at  this  point  to divide  our sample  of countries  into
three  groups. The  first  group  is  essentially  those  countries  which,  faced
wiLh a deteriorating  current  account  position  at the  end  of the  1970's  and
with the subsequent  drying  up of sources  of foreign  borrowing  following  the
debt  crisis  of 1982,  have attempted  to reduce  domestic  demand  and  have allowed
a  much  more rapid  exchange  rate  depreciation  than  in the  preceding  decade.
The  countries  in this  group  include  Kenya,  Tanzania,  Zambia,  Philippines,  Sri
Lanka,  Argentina,  Bolivia,  Brazil,  Chile  and  Uruguay.
Even  within  this  group,  however,  there  are  significant  departures
from  the  general  picture. In Zambia,  the  crisis  started  off rather  early  when
the  world  copper  price  fell  by almost  502  in  1975.  Chile  and  Sri  Lanka
embarked  upon  extensive  trade  liberalization  programs  in the  1970's  which
fostered  higher  growth  in the  second  half  of the  decade. Both  economies  have
nevertheless  suffered  during  the  recession  of the  early  1980's.
The second  group  of countries  consists  of the  net  oil  exporters:
Egypt,  Nigeria,  Mexico,  Tunisia  and  Indonesia  and  countries  such  as Peru  and
Sudan  with significant  domestic  oil  production.  These  countries  all  either
benefited  or  were less  adversely  affected  by the  1970's  oil  price  rises  than
other  countries. Excessive  government  spending  in  Nigeria  during  the  middle
and  later  1970's  however,  greatly  exacerbated  the  Dutch  Disease  effects
normally  associated  with an appreciating  real  exchange  rate.  The  oil
exporting  countries  were  correspondingly  adversely  affected  by the  oil  price
slump  after  1982.
Of these,  Indonesia  produced  the  most positive  policy  response  to the
1982  oil  price  slump  with a  tightening  of fiscal  policy,  a significant
depreciation  of the  rupiah  and  reforms  of both  the  financial  and  tax systems.
Mexico  also  allowed  a significant  depreciation  at the  same  time  that  the-7-
country  embarked  upon  a  structural  adjustment  which  included  an opening  up to
foreign  trade. In  contrast,  Nigeria  given  its  fixed  exchange  rate  policy  and
burgeoning  public  expenditure,  ran  into  a severe  current  account  deficit  in
the  early  1980s. The  Nigerian  economy  then  went into  recession  when strong
limitations  were placed  upon  imports. Egypt  and  Sudan  were perhaps  less
affected  and  Egypt  has  continued  as  before,  to balance  a substantial  current
account  deficit  against  an inflow  of foreign  investment.  Tunisia  was in  a
somewhat  similar  position  although  the  current  account  deficit  was more severe
and  eventually  import  controls  were imposed  at the  end  of our  period  in  1985.
Following  heavy  public  spending  from  the  mid-1970's  onwards.  Peru  faced  a
deficit  in its  current  account  by 1981,  which  it financed  by foreign
borrowing. Its  experiment  with trade  liberalization  in  the  early  1980's  was
eventually  abandoned  in  1984,  when the  deficit  became  unsustainable  amid  other
socialist  policy  practices. Finally,  Sudan's  external  position  has
deteriorated  in the  face  of growing  public  expenditure,  much  of it,  as in
Egypt,  arising  from  subsidies  to loss-making  parastatals. There  has  also  been
a  reluctance  to allow  sufficient  exchange  rate  flexibility,  severe  droughts
and  more recently,  declining  terms  of trade.
The third  group  of countries  consists  of Colombia,  India,  Israel,
Pakistan,  South  Korea  and  Zimbabwe. Recent  country  experience  is  much  more
diverse  here.
Neither  India  nor  Pakistan  have  experienced  the  growing  crisis
observed  in  most  LDC's. Although  both  countries  have run  significant  fiscal
deficits,  the  degree  of deficit  monetization  has  been limited. Pakistan
enjoyed  substantial  foreign  aid  inflows  and  overseas  worker  remittances  during
the  1970's  while  bot.a  countries  have  been  slowly  liberalizing  their  initially
highly  protected  economies  during  the  1980's. Unlike  most other  countries  inthe  sample,  India  and  Pakistan  have  enjoyed  faster  economic  growth  in the
1980's  then  previously.
Columbia  is  a similar  case-  in  that  she  has  not  experienced  a crisis
like  most  LDCs.  Although  there  have  been some  macro  disequilibria  --  the
clearest  example  being  a growing  fiscal  deficit  --  inflation  has  been low  and
the  openness  of the  econciy  remained  high during  the  1980s,  thus  allowing
export  promction  and  a strong  supply  response  to  adjustment  policies.
Israel  is obviously  a special  case  --  a country  with large  military
expenditure  financed,  for  strategic  reasons,  by its  allies. In common  with a
number  of the  Latin  American  countries,  Israel  has  experienced  rapid  infle'
given  monetary  expansion  emanating  from  its  fiscal  deficit. The  country  has a
per  capita  GDP  that is  much  higher  than  that  of any  other  country  in the
sample  and  is  on a par  'thL  the  poor  West  European  economies. Israel  has
experienced,  however,  a slowdown  in economic  growth  and increased  foreign
indebtedness  after  1974.
South  Korea  is often  taken  as a  model  for  today's  LDCs  given  its
prudent  fiscal  and  monetary  management  and  willingness  to  maintain  a
competitive  foreign  exchange  rate  in  combination  with export  promotion
policies. Unlike  the  other  countries  in  our  sample,  South  Korea  has conducted
a policy  of consistent  trade  and  financial  liberalization  from  the  early
1960's  onwards. Although  she  has  borrowed  throughout  most of  the  period  to
finance  a current  account  deficit,  the  additional  investment  generated  has
allowed  external  debt  to fall  relative  to  both  GDP  and  exports. South  Korea
has  also  experienced  the  most rapid  industrialization  of any  country  in  the
sample.
Finally,  Zimbabwe  is another  special  case. After  the  Unilateral
Declaration  of Independence  in 1965,  the  economy  grew  rapidly  for  about  a
decade  under  a regime  of import  substitution  compelled  by tz-ade  sanctions.-9-
The  economy  slowed  down  dramatically,  however,  aL internal  conflict
intensified  in the  mid-1970's. Independence  in  1980  brought  an economic  boom
which  petered  out  in 1982  as the  authorities  took  measures  to  deal  with a
growing  current  account  deficit. So far,  the  government  has  maintained  the
system  of quantitatis}  import  controls  introduced  in  the  1960's  by the
previous  government.
3.  Theoretical  Considerations
As  we have seen,  the  countries  in  our  sample  have  experienced  a  wide
range  of variation  in  their  terms  of trade,  in their  real  exchange  rates,  in
the  application  of demand  management  policies  and  in the  degree  of trade
protection  applied. It is  useful  therefore  to review  briefly  the labor  market
effects  that  may  be anticipated  in following  standard  macroeconomic  theory.
We follow  here,  as a starting  point,  a simple  model  that  divides  the
economy  into  three  sectors,  exportables  (X),  importables  (M)  and  inontradables
(N),  with  corresponding  prices,  PX,  PM and  PN.  In the  short  run  version  of
the  model,  fixed  amounts  of capital  are  assumed  to  be specific  to each  sector,
thus  ensuring  upward  sloping  supply  curves  under  conventional  assumptions.  PX
and  PM are  determined  by  world  prices  at the  going  exchange  rate,  while  PN is
determined  endogenously  by domestic  supply  and  demand. Total  labor  force  and
the state  of technology  in  each sector  are  taken  as fixed  as a starting  point.
A key further  assumption  is that  the  ranking  in  descending  order  of labor
intensity  is  X, N and  then  M.  Although  some  of the  results  reported  below
depend  critically  upon  this  ranking,  this  would  nevertheless  seem  to  be a
plausible  ordering  for  a typical  LDC.  Finally,  a competitive  labor  market  is
assumed  with the  wage rate,  W, equalized  across  sectors. 2
Consider  first  a deterioration  in the  terms  of trade  as given  by, for
example,  a rise  in  the  price  of imports. As a result,  production  will shift- 10  -
away  from  X towards  H with a  corresponding  movement  of labor,  and  given  the
sectoral  capital  stock,  the  real  product  wage in importables,  W/PH  must fall
while  that  in  exportables,  W/PX  must rise. The  effect  upon  employment  in  the
nontradables  sector  is,  however,  ambiguous,  as the  demand  for  nontradables  may
either  rise  or fall  depending  upon  the  strength  of the  income  and  substitution
effects. The  real  consumption  wage (the  wage,  W, divided  by an appropriate
cost  of living  index  calculated  from  Px,  PM,  and  PN)  will rise  in terms  of
exportables  and  nontradables  and  fall  in  terms  of importables.  In a long  run
context,  with  a mobile  capital  stock,  nontradables  production  may  once  again,
either  increase  or  decrease  --  due  to substitution  in demand  towards
nontradables  countered  by a negative  income  effect  derived  from  the
deterioration  in terms  of trade  --  whi1le  wages  will decrease  relative  to all
goods. As the  predominant  labor  reallocation  is  towards  the  more  capital
intensive  sector,  there  will also  be a fall  in  aggregate  labor  demand.
The  analytical  implications  are  symmetric  if one  instead  considers
improving  terms  of trade  arising  from  an increased  export  price,  except  that
in the  long  run,  there  is  a strong  presumption  that  nontradable  production
will rise. Likewise,  the  case  of an increased  tariff  is similar  to that  of a
world  importable  ?rice  increase  of equivalent  amount,  except  that  the  negative
income  effect  is less  as the  country  retains  the  tariff  revenue. In this  case
there  is therefore  a  presumption  that  employment  will increase  in  the
nontradables  sector  with a corresponding  fall  in  the  real  product  wage.
The  effects  of a  devaluation  can  best  be handled  by following  the
tradition  of the 'Australian'  or 'Dependent  Economy  model' 3 and  collapsing
importables  and  exportables  into  a single  tradable 4 goods,  T,  with  price  PT.
The  desired  labor  market  effects  would  then  be a reallocation  of employment
from  nontradables  to tradables,  a rise  in  W/PN,  a fall  in  W/PT and  a fall  in
the  real  consumption  wage.  This  last  point  is  particularly  crucial  in this- 11  -
context,  eince  if real  wages remAin  at their  initial  level,  then  the  rise  in
wages  induced  by the  increase  in  PT  will in turn  push  up PN until  the  original
real  exchange  rate (PN/PT)  is restored. Essentially  this result  follows  from
the  fact  that  given  tastes,  technologies  and  capital  and  labor  endowments,  the
model  determines  unique  values  for  the  ratios,  W/PT and  PN/PT  in equilibrium.
Although  a devaluation  will initially  lower  these  ratios,  these  effects  will
be eroded  by the  clearing  of consequent  excess  demands  in  the  labor  market  and
and  nontradables  sector,  unless,  of  course,  these  markets  are  characterized  by
substantial  excess  supply  at the  outset. The  conclusion  is therefore  that  a
devaluation  must  be accompanied  by appropriate  demand  management  policies  such
as increased  public  savings  and  tighter  credit  control. 5 However,  the  long
term  implication  of this  combination  of expenditure-switching  and  expenditure-
reducing  policies  for  the  level  of the  equilibrium  real  wage is less  clear  as
this  will depend  upon  the  relative  labor  intensities  of the  two sectors. The
lower  demand  for  nontradables  arising  from  expenditures  reduction  policies  and
the  subsequent  contraction  of that  sector  will allow  the  real  product  wage in
non-tradables  to rise. The  real  product  wage  must still,  of course,  fall  in
tradables.
Turning  now  to the  labor  market  effects  of  expenditure-reducing
policies  implemented  in  the  absence  of any  corresponding  switching  policies,
these  will depend  upon  the  nature  of the  rigidities  that  one  believes  to be
relevant. If  wages  and  PN are  entirely  flexible,  then  after  a transitional
period  in  which increased  frictional  unemployment  is likely  to arise  as labor
is reallocated  towards  tradables,  given  a fall  in  PN/PT,  the  economy  will
gravitate  back  towards  full  employment.  The  real  product  wages,  W/PN and  W/PT
will  have risen  and fallen  respectively.  [If,  however,  nominal  wages  are
downwardly  rigid,  or  more realistically  given  domestic  inflation,  their  rate
of increase  fails  to fall  sufficiently  like  in  the  presence  of  wage indexation- 12  -
schemes,  then  persistent  unemployment  is likely  to occur.) Slow  adjustment  in
the  rate  of change  of  money  wages  thus  er3cerbates  the  undesirable
consequences  of macroeconomic  adjustment.
There  are  two  furtLer  mechanibms  by  which  expenditure-reducing
policies  may  influence  the  behavior  of  real  consumption  wages.  The  first  is
simply  that  there  may  be a  direct  reduction  in  the  rate  of growth  of  public
sector  employment  relative  to that  of labor  supply. This  should  depress  the
labor  market  clearing  level  of the  real  consumption  wage.  The  second  is that
consequent  reduction  in  the  level  of  domestic  investment  will lower  both  thp
rate  of growth  of the  economy  as a  whole  and  the  rate  of increase  in real
wages. Real  wage resistance  will clearly  raise  transitional  unemployment
under  these  circumstances.  This  effe-t  will  be further  exacerbated  if import
controls  constrain  production  levels  in some  sectors  by limiting  the
availability  of intermediate  inputs.
There  are  a number  of qualifications  that  need to  be added  to this
analysis  before  moving  the  discussion  to  the subject  of actual  labor  market
trends  in  LDCs.
(i)  If labor  supply  grows  more quickly  than  capital  stock,  as may  well
have  been occurring  in  many  LDC's  over  the  past  decade  or so,  then  --
although  the  relative  movements  of real  product  and  real  consumption
wages  given  various  stimuli,  should  still  be as described  above  --
there  will be a further  downward  trend  superimposed  on their  values
corresponding  to labor  market  clearing. This  may  be offset,  however,
by technical  change  which  may in  turn  affect  labor  deployment  across
sectors. We would  also  anticipate  growing  structural  unemployment
associated  with a lack  of productive  capacity.
(ii) The  distinction  between  the  modern  and informal  sectors  has  been
ignored. If labor  market  rigidities  in  the form  of real  or  nominal- 13 -
wage  re1sstance  apply  only to the formal sector, then thisiwould
suggest  informal  sector  expansion  as  a plausible  alternative  to
growing  open  unemployment.  Moreover,  in the  presence  of asymmetric
wage indexation  a segmented  labor  market  may  be associated  with a
slower  supply  response  and  with inequitable  distributive  results,
thus likely  affecting  the  credibility  of  macroeconomic  adjustment
programs  (Lopez  & Riveros,  1988).
(iii)  We have  assumed  perfect  labor  mobility  between  sectors. In the
absence  of this  we would  expect  intersectoral  wage differentials  to
change  over  time  between  expanding  and  contracting  sectors. This
point  is likely  to  be particularly  relevant  given  the  rural-urban
relationship.  In  particular,  we have assumed  that labor  is
homogenous,  while  the  existence  of different  skills,  some  of  which
may  be specific  to certain  sectors,  may  have implications  for  wage
differentials,  and  it  may also  impose  direct  limits  on structural
adjustment.
This  admittedly  rather  short  summary  of the  main labor  market  effects
that  one  would  anticipate  given  changes  in domestic  policy  and  the  external
environment  does  give  us some  insights  into  the  trends  that  we would  expect
given  an outline  of a country's  past  macroeconomic  history. Taking  the  most
common  historical  pattern  observed  across  the  countries  in  our sample,  the
trend  towards  protection  and  import  substitution  observed  prior  to the  mid-
1970's  should  have  depressed  the  growth  of labor  demand  in  the formal  sector
with a shift  in  employment  towards  import-competing  sectors. Adverse
movements  in  the terms  of trade  later  in  the  decade  would  have exacerbated
this  effect. Real  wage resistance,  if  present  in the  formal  sector,  would
encourage  both  the shift  into  informal  activities  and  possibly  the  development
of open  unemployment.  Otherwise  the  rate  of growth  in  real  consumption  wages- 14 -
should  have fallen,  while  the  tendency  to allow  the  real  rate  of exchange  to
appreciate  would lead  to  a reallocation  in  employment  towards  nontradables.
Stricter  import  controls  and  more austere  demand  management  in the  early
1980's  would  further  curtail  formal  sector  expansion,  place  downward  pressure
on real  wages  and  give  further  impetus  to the  growth  of the  informal  sector
and  open  unemployment.
4.  Labor  Market  Trends
4.1  Labor  supply
Little  emerges  from  our  review  that  was not  already  fairly  well known
in connection  with supply  trends. The  salient  facts  are  as follows:
4.1.1  Population  growth  rates  range  between  1.4Z (Korea)  and  4.12 (Kenya)
and  are  highest  in the  sub-Saharan  African  countries. There  is  no
evidence  of reduced  population  growth  across  the  sample  as a  whole,
and in  a number  of countries,  e.g.  Kenya,  Nigeria,  Tunisia,  Zambia
and Zimbabwe,  growth  rates  have increased  since  1965. Decreased
mortality  and  an increase  in the  proportion  of the  population  in  the
most fertile  age  groups  are  the  main  explanation  for  this  last
phenomenon. In  the  absence  of specific  policies,  population  growth
rates  are  not expected  to fall  by much in  the  poorer  LDC's  during  the
remainder  of this  century  and  will rise  in some  of the  poorest
countries.
4.1.2  Labor  force  participation  rates  have  either  remained  constant  or
declined  over  time. Among  males,  as in the  developed  countries,
declining  participation  is  mainly  due  to educational  expansion.
Among  females,  however,  different  trends  are  observed  across- 15  -
countries. The  main  determinants  of the  overall  female  participation
rate  are: (a)  the  urbanization  rate  --  female  participation  being
higher  in rural  areas  given  greater  opportunities  for  productive
activity  around  the  home; (b)  the  average  educational  level  of the
female  labor  force  --  this  work  both  ways:  school  attendance  reduces
participation  among  young  workers  but increases  it once  schooling  is
completed;  (t)  cyclical  changes  in labor  market  conditions  --  here
the  evidence  is that  the  discouraged  worker  effect  dominates  the
added  worker  effect  [Sanchez  (1987)  and  Riveros  (1987)];  and (d)
socio-cultural  attitudes  prevailing  in  the  country  in  question.
Taking  (d)  as  given  thus  suggests  that  the  magnitude  and  direction  of
female  participation  rates  over  time  is  a function  of changes  in the
first  three  variables. In countries  such  as those  in sub-Saharan
Africa,  within  which  rural-urban  migration  has been  very rapid,
female  participation  rates  have tended  to fall. In countries  such  as
Tunisia,  Israel  and  Korea,  where  rural-urban  migration  has slowed
down  given  less  growth  in  urban  job  opportunities,  the  female
participation  rate  has  grown  with increased  secondary  education. 6
Hansen  (1985)  also  points  out  that  in  Egypt,  movements  in  hidden
unemployment  are  a likely  source  of observed  participation  rate
variation. This  is,  of course,  another  argument  suggesting
procyclical  variation  in labor  supply.
4.1.3  There  is  virtually  no evidence  presented  anywhere  in  our  sources  of
information  about  geographical  labor  immobility.  All  of the studies
except  for  those  on Egypt  [Hansen  (op.cit.)],  India  [Lucas  (1986)],
and  Israel  [Ben  Porath  (1985)],  emphasize  the  importance  of rural-
urban  migration  as a  major  past source  of urban  population  growth.
Egypt  and  Sri  Lanka  are  in a sense  special  cases  here,  as the  bulk  of- 16 -
the rural  population  live  near to  urban  areas  thus  rendering  the
rural-urban  distinction  somewhat  obsolete. India  is also  somewhat
unusual  in  that  the  rate  of rural  to  urban  population  remained
constant  over several  decades,  while  in Israel,  net immigration  has
been the  most important  factor. There  is  unanimity  in that  the
importance  of economic  motives  is the  main source  of  migratory
movement  and  there  seems  to be little  doubt  that  urban  immigration
flows  have  varied  positively  with expected  urban-rural  earnings
differentials.  There  is evidence,  however,  in accordance  with
observed  behavior  in developed  countries,  that  the  propensity  to
migrate  increases  with education  [see  also  Collier  & Riveros  (1987)].
Rural-rural  migration  flows  are  also  examined  in three  casest
Indonesia  [Manning  and  Mazumdar  (1985)),  Kenya  [Fallon  (1985)]  and
Sudan [Fallon  (1987a)]. In all  three  cauntries  these  flows  are
considerably  larger  than  those  between  rural  and  urban  areas. Sudan
presents  a classic  case  here  in that  as  much as 20Z  of the  rural
labor  force  may  move  across  the  country  and  back  again  in  a given
year  responding  to  changing  economic  conditions  in the  areas  of
origin  and  destination.
4.1.4  The  average  level  of schooling  per  worker  has  grown  and  continues  to
grow in  every  country  except  Israel. This  has  the  effect  of shifting
labor  supply  towards  urban  areas. Provision  of formal  manual  and
professional  training  has,  however,  grown  more slowly  and  it is
precisely  in these  areas  that  labor  shortages  still  occur.
4.1.5  International  out-migration  is,  or has  been,  a significant  feature  in
Egypt,  Indonesia,  Pakistan  and  Sudan. No common  pattern  can  be
attributed  here to  the  effects  of  out-migration  upon  the  domestic
skill  structure  as the  skill  composition  of emigrants  depends  upon- 17 -
the  structure  of excess  labor  demand  in  the receiving  countries.
Thus in  Pakistan  and  Sudan  where  out-migration  is  disproportionate
among  skilled  workers,  the  result  has  been an exacerbation  of
domestic  skill  shortages,  while  in  Indonesia,  where  emigrants  were
generally  unskilled,  this  has  not  been  the  case.
There  is some  evidence  consistent  with the  proposition  that  given  a
macroeconomic  disturbance,  unskilled  labor  will  move reasonably  freely  from
contracting  to  expanding  sectors. In the  case  of  Latin  American  countries,
however,  especially  Chile,  Colombia,  and  Argentina,  sectoral  shifts  in
production  have  been accompanied  by labor  market  disruptions  associated  with
poor labor  mobility  between  urban  tradable  and  nontradable  activities  due  to
segmentation.  In fact,  labor  mobility  between  urban  tradables  and
nontradables  has  been  usually  hindered  by job  security  regulations  and  the
existence  of relatively  high  minimum  wages  covering  mostly  tradable
activities.
In  most LDCs,  a  problem  that  is sometimes  raised  is that  rural  to
urban  flows  tend  to be irreversible,  thus  making  difficult  a structural
adjustment  process  aimed  at shifting  resources  back  to agriculture. There
are,  in fact,  two  types  of evidence  that  may  cast  some  doubt  on the
persistence  of this  problem:  (a)  circular  rural-urban  migration,  both of  a
seasonal  and  of a longer  term  nature,  has  been  observed  in some  countries,
e.g.  India  and  Kenya;  (b)  following  the  oil  price  slump,  there  has  been  very
substantial  return  migration  into  the  rural  areas  of Nigeria  [Collier  (1987),
Collier  & Riveros  (1987)]. Unfortunately,  similar  phenomena  are  either
nonexistent  or  have  not  been empirically  substantiated  in other  countries.- 18  -
4.2  Labor  Demand
The  broad  picture  that  emerges  in  almost  all  of the  countries  is  that
during  the  1970's,  there  has  been  a reallocation  of total  employment  away from
primary  production  and  towards  the  secondary  and  tertiary  sectors. Table  3
shows  the  sectoral  shares  of total  employment  for  the  countries  in  which
regular  labor  force  surveys  are  undertaken. 7 In virtually  every  case,  the
employment  share  of agriculture  and  mining  has  fallen  while  that  of services
has increased. 8 These  results  are  also,  with the  ex..eption  of Bolivia,
consistent  with the  proposit:an  echoed  regularly  through  the  country  studies,
that  employment  has  been  growing  more  quickly  in  nontradables  producing
sectors.
Of itself,  these  results  may reflect  little  more than  the  trends  that
one  would  expect  on the  basis  of the  patterns  approach  suggested  by Chenery
(1960). The  failure  of the  share  of  manufacturing  employment  to grow
consistently  among  the  country  sample  could  then  be explained  in  this  context
by a faster  labor  productivity  growth  and  the  development  of highly
inefficient  capital-intensive  industries  protected  through  several  policy
instruments.  This  type  of explanation  is investigated  in considerable  detail
and  broadly  valijated  for  Tunisia  (Morrisson  (1987)]. Here,  however,  as
productivity  growth  in the  manufacturing  sector  was  not  much faster  than  in
other  sectors,  the  share  of  manufacturing  employment  did,  in fact,  rise
significantly  over  time.
Although  the  patterns  type  approach  may  be a useful  way of analyzing
long-term  trends,  there  are  two  other  explanations  which  are  of undoubted
importance.  The  first  is that  in  most  of the  countries,  public  sector
employment  has grown  disproportionately  over  the  period. This  has  been
particularly  true  in sub-Saharan  Africa,  Mexico  and  India,  but  has  been  of
less  quantitative  importance  where  the  share  of  public  sector  employment  is- 19  -
either  relatively  low  or has  expanded  less  than  proportionately  as in other
parts  of  Asia and  in some  of the  Latin  American  countries. Thus,  since  the
public  sector  production  is  proportionately  higher  in services  than  in the
private  sector,  public  sector  employment  expansion  tends  to increase  the share
of tertiary  employment. The  other  explanation  is that,  in  the  absence  of
mobile  surplus  resources,  growing  domestic  absorption  relative  to productive
capacity  will tend  to  divert  resources  into  nontradable  production,  as indeed,
will increased  expenditure  following  an  export-price  windfall  as in the  oil-
exporting  countries. The  observed  sectoral  shifts  in  employment  are  thus  also
consistent  with the  macroeconomic  history  of  most  countries  over  the  period,
particularly  in considering  the  currency  overvaluation  achieved  by certain
policy  approaches  in  many  LDCs  during  the  1970's.
So far,  we have restricted  the  discussion  to  employment  as a  whole,
i.e.  wage emplovment,  self-employment  and  unpaid  household  labor. Most of the
country  studies  give specific  attention,  however,  to the  behavior  of  modern
sector  employment. Although  the  latter  has  no universal  definition  across
countries,  it  usually  refers  to  wage employment  in  enterprises  over  a given
size (e.g.  in India  this  would  be establishments  employing  ten  workers  or
more).  Public  sector  employment,  whether  in central  or local  government  or
parastatals,  is  treated  as  being  exclusively  within  the  modern  sector.
Although  modern  sector  employment  is  disproportionately  large  in  urban  areas,
it  would  be incorrect  to regard  it  as being  exclusively  urban. For  example,
in  Kenya,  modern  sector  wage employment  is  divided  roughly  equally  between
urban  and rural  areas.
Two  common  messages  emerge  regarding  modern  sector  employment  trends
in  LDCs.  The first  is that  as  with  total  employment,  service  sectors  have
tended  to grow  more quickly  than  others. Here,  the  rapid  growth  of the  public
sector  is of considerable  proportionate  importance,  particularly  in  countries- 20 -
like  Mexico,  India,  Argentina,  Colombia  dnd sub-Saharan  Africa. The shift  of
resources  towards  nontradables  production  is  thus  reflected  in the  modern
sector  as  well as in the  economy  as a  whole.
The  other  common  observation  is that  in  the  sub-Saharan  African
countries  and  in  Asia excluding  South  Korea,  modern  sector  employment  growth
is inadequate,  even  under  the  most optimistic  assumptions,  to absorb  additions
to the  existing  labor  force. This  has also  been  the  case  since  1980  in the
Latin  American  countries,  where,  following  the  recession,  modern  sector
employment  has grown  more slowly  than  previously,  particularly  among  large  and
medium-sized  enterprises. Since  rural-urban  migration  continues  at a
significant rate in most countries --  Nigeria being a recent exception --  it
follows  that,  unless  there  is a sufficient  decline  in  the  urban  participation
rate,  either  urban  informal  sector  employment  or  urban  unemployment  or both
must  have  been expanding  rapidly.
4.3  Informal  Sector  Employment  and  Unemployment
The  urban  informal  sector  has  been  defined  in  a number  of  ways
according  to such  different  criteria  as establishment  size,  the  ratio  of self-
employed  workers,  and lack  of coverage  under  existing  labor  regulations.  To a
large  extent,  these  criteria  tend  to  overlap  rather  heavily  in  practice,
although  the  general  consensus  seems  to favor  the  coverage  criterion  and  this
is the  one  implicitly  used in  this  review. 9 The  basic  assumption  is  that  the
informal  sector  is  characterized  by free  entry,  and  a  neoclassical  labor
market,  although  since  the  sector  is  usually  very  heterogenous  --  ranging  from
casually  employed  temporary  migrants  to self-employed  workers  earning  more
than  their  counterparts  in the  modern  sector  --  the  former  characteristic  is
only likely  to apply  to a part  of the  sector.- 21 -
In general  the  overviews  indicate  a  mixed  response  to either
chronically  inadequate  or reduced  modern  sector  employment  growth. Riveros
(1988c),  based  on PREALC/ILO  data,  has found  a rather  small  increase  in
informal  sector  employment  in  most countries  in spite  of the  large  macro
fluctuations  experienced  in the  1980's. There  are  nonetheless  some
differences  among  countries,  depending  upon  how the  urban  informal  sector  is
measured. For  instance,  in  both  Argentina  and  Brazil,  the  urban  informal
bector  has  been  a  major  absorber  of the  increased  labor  supply  during  the
1980's  while  the  open  unemployment  rate  has failed  to increase. In Chile,
informal  sector  employment  actually  fell  between  1981  and  1983 (Edwards
(1986)],  while  the  open  unemployment  rate  nearly  doubled  over  the same  period.
In  contrast,  Uruguay  and  Mexico  have  experienced  a sharp  increase  in urban
informal  employmeat  in  the  1980s.  which  in the  case  of the  former  has been
accompanied  by an expansion  in open  unemployment  [Riveros  (1988a,  1988c)]. In
Bolivia,  the  informal  sector  absorbed  part  of the  shortfall  not taken  up by
above  normal  public  sector  employment  growth,  unemployment  remained  almost
static,  and  the  participation  rate  dropped  significantly.  This  last  finding,
while  consistent  with the  discouraged  worker  hypothesis  discussed  earlier,
should  be interpreted  with some  care  as it  may suggest  also  an increase  in
hidden  urban  unemployment  [Klinov  (1987)].10  Howeve;:,  Bolivia  seems  to be the
only  country  in the  sample  within  which  this  effect  v'as  strong  enough  to
offset  a  major  part  of the  expected  imbalance  between  the  growth  of labor
supply  and  modern  sector  employment.
Inevitably,  the  evidence  for  other  countries  in the  sample  is
somewhat  scanty  given  a lack  of suitable  time-series  data.  In  the Sub-Saharan
African  countries  there  is little  doubt  that  informal  sector  employment  has
been  expanding  very rapidly. In Kenya,  for  example,  the  informal  sector
doubled  its  share  of total  urban  employment  between  1973  and 1984. In- 22 -
Zimbabwe,  the  urban  informal  sector  was restricted  prior  to 1980  by government
legislation  regarding  African  urban  residence,  but it  is believed  that  both
informal  sector  employment  and  open  unemployment  have  expanded  rapidly  since
then. The  open  unemployment  rate  in 1982  was 10.8Z  in the  economy  as a  whole
and  18.51  when communal  farmers  (i.e.  the  population  residing  on designated
native  lands)  were omitted. These  rather  high rates  reflects  substantially
increased  rural-urban  migration  since  Independence  and  the  relative
underdevelopment  of the  informal  sector. In Zambia  and  Nigeria  the  informal
sector  is  much  more developed  and is  now the  major  source  of urban  labor
absorption. Open  unemployment  is  of unknown  but  almost  certainly  huge
proportions, 11 especially,  as in the  other  LDC's,  among  young  people  with
above  average  education. In Sudan  there  seems  to  be less  point  in
distinguishing  between  the  formal  and  informal  sectors  given  a lack  of
institutional  wage support  and  the  depressed  level  of  wages  in the  predominant
public  sector. There  is little  doubt,  however,  that  non-wage  employment  must
have  been  growing  in urban  areas  given  rural-urban  migration  following  the
drought. Egyptian  labor  markets  also  appear  to  be fairly  non-dualistic  with
flexible  wage rates  outside  the  public  sector,  while in  the  latter,  wages
appear  to  have  declined  below  those  in  the  private  sector  [Hansen  (1985)].
In  most  of the  Asian  countries,  i.e.  India,  Indonesia,  Pakistan  and
the  Philippines,  informal  sector  activities  have,  on the  whole,  expanded  to
fill  the  gap  left  by insufficient  modern  sector  employment  growth. It is only
in  the  Philippines  that  open  unemployment  seems  to  have risen  seriously  in
recent  years,  although  as  Riveros  (1987)  points  out,  growing  underemployrment
is  a much  more serious  problem  and is  related  to  increased  overcrowding  in  the
informal  sector  following  the  recession  of the  1980's.- 23 -
4.4  Wage  Rates
4.4.1 Real  Consumption  Wages
In  Table  4  we present  some  available  information  on rates  of growth
of real  consumption  wages  in  the  formal  sector  for  three  periods:  the  mid-
1960's  to one  year  after  the  1973  oil  shock;  the  remainder  of the  1970's  and
the  early  1980's. Whenever  possible,  we have  used  the  wage series  for
construction  workers  on the  grounds  that  this  is least  affected  by improved
skill  levels  over  time. The  data  for  1974/80  and  1980/84  in the  six  Latin
American  countries  refer,  however,  to average  manufacturing  sector  wages  and
are likely,  therefore,  to overstate  the  wage  growth  enjoyed  by a  worker  of a
given  skill  level. This  effect  is  neverthelesss  likely  to be small. The
urban  consumer  price  index  is  used  as the  deflator  in  each  country.
There  are  two  main facts  that  stand  out: (i)  there  is little  prima
facia  evidence  on downward  real  wage rigidity  as  often  suggested  by opponents
of exchange  rate  devaluation.  Nine  out  of the  sixteen  countries  for  which
data  have  been  presented  have experienced  a fall  in real  wages  over  one  or
more  periods. A recent  survey  of real  wage growth  over  a  much  wider  range  of
LDC's,  ILO (1987)  has further  suggested  that  in fact,  since  the  early  1970's,
real  wages  have fallen  in  most  LDC's. The  same  evidence  is pointed  out  by
Riveros  (1988d)  with regard  to real  labor  costs  --  considering  both  wage and
non-wage  costs  of labor  --  in 21  LDCs (Table  7).  Whether  this  observed  trend
is due  to the  pressure  of  market  forces,  or to institutional  intervention,  or
to some  combination  of  both remains  a  question  to  be discussed  later  in this
paper. The  broad  picture  across  countries,  is  however,  that  real  wages  have
tended  to  fall in  sub-Saharan  Africa  and  in some  Latin  American  countries,  but
less  so in South  and  East  Asia.  (ii) By and  large,  real  wage growth  has
roughly  followed  that  of  GDP  per  capita  --  a  pattern  consistent  with the
expected  outcome  of  market  forces. This  does  conflict  with the  predictions  of- 24 -
models  based  upon  surplus  labor  such  as that  of  Lewis  (1954)  unless  one
assumes  that  the  observed  variation  in real  wages  over  time  is  entirely  due  to
changing  institutional  wage-setting  practices  and  measurement  error. In
recent  years  real  wages  have  tended  to grow  more  slowly  than  GDP per  capita
which  may,  however,  suggest  some  lessening  of institutional  wage support.
4.4.2  Inter-sectoral  Wage  Differentials
One  would  also  expect  to find  some  evidence  of systematic  changes  in
inter-sectoral  relative  wage rates  over  time.  In  Table  5,  we show  indices  for
the  wages  of agricultural  workers  relative  to those  in  manufacturing  and
construction  for  nine  of the  twenty-one  countries. Since  the  data  consist  of
average  wage rates  it is  not  possible  to standardize  for  changing  skill
composition  of the  different  sectors,  thus  leading  to a potential  bias  which
is  probably  less  serious  for  the  agriculture-construction  wage differential
than  for  that  of agriculture-manufacturiag.  The  series  also fail  to take  into
account  differences  in rates  of increase  in  the  cost  of living  between  rural
and  urban  areas.
To interpret  the  series  in Table  5 there  are  at least  three  factors
that  one  must take  into  account:  (i)  that  given  some  degree  of rural-urban
labor  market  segmentation,  the  agricultural  wage should  fall  relative  to that
in  other  sectors  during  periods  of rapid  modern  sector  growth  relative  to that
of agriculture;  (ii)  that  the  degree  of institutional  intervention  regarding
both  modern  sector  and  agricultural  wages  may  change  over  time; (iii)  that
skill  accumulation  in agriculture  is  lower  than  in .he  modern  sector  thus
leading  to  a fall  in  observed  ratio  of agricultural  to  modern  sector  wages.
This  latter  effect  may be offset,  however,  if,  as is  often  argued,  the
propensity  to  migrate  to urban  areas  increases  as rural  residents  acquire  more
education  and  the  disparity  between  urban  and  rural  amenities  widens.- 25 -
The relative  wage  movements  shown  in  Table  5 suggest  a rather  wide
set  of experiences. In Zambia,  for  example,  agriculture  has grown  more
quickly  than  the  rest  of the  economy  since  1974  and  one  observes  a  marked  rise
in  the  relative  wage.  In Zimbabwe,  at first  glance  one  seems  to observe  the
opposite  happening  between  1974  and  1980  as the  relative  wage rose  during  a
period  when agricultural  output  fell  at a rate  of 9.7Z  per  annum  while  GDP
remained  constant. This  period  was  one,  however,  during  which internal
conflict  intensified  in rural  areas  and  there  was a substantial  reduction  in
rural  labor  supply. As explained  later,  the  rise  in  the  relative  wage in the
early  1980's  was due  to the  imposition  of an aggressive  minimum  wage policy
which  raised  average  agricultural  wages  by  much  more than  wages in  other
sectors.
In both  India  and  Pakistan,  agricultural  growth  was  not far  behind
that  of the  rest  of the  economy  prior  to  1980,  while  the share  of rural  in
total  population  has  not  declined  as  quickly  as in  most  other  LDC'd. In
Pakistan,  real  agricultural  wages  grew  substantially  during  the 'Green
Revolution'  period  of 1966-1973  [Ahmad  and  Stern  (1985)],  but fell  again  in
the  mid-1970's  given  irrigation  problems  and  land  reforms. Institutional  wage
support  introduced  in the  early  1970's  and  the  effect  of emigration  to the
Gulf in  the  later  1970's  then  explain  the  subsequent  rise  in the  agricultural
wage relative  to  manufacturing  during  the  1974-1980  period.
In the  case  of Korea  (Richardson  and  Kim (1986a)],  the  lack  of
effective  institutional  intervention  in  the  labor  market  has  been emphasized.
The relative  wage of agricultural  workers  relative  to those  in construction
has  not  changed  greatly  over  the  period,  thus  indicating  that  the
intersectoral  wage differential  for  (say)  unskilled  labor  has remained  roughly
constant. The  period  post-1975  was,  however,  one in  which  excess  labor  supply
among  the  unskilled  tended  to  disappear  [Richardson  and  Kim (1986b)]  thus- 26 -
compressing  unskilled/skilled  wage  differentials  and  allowing  the  agriculture-
manufacturing  wage ratio  to rise.
In Sri  Lanka,  the  liberalization  attempt  of 1977  included  the
freezing  of agricultural  prices,  the  abolition  of import  controls  and  tariff
reductions.  The  agricultural  sector  has  certainly  grown  more quickly  since
that  time  and  this is  presumably  reflected  in an increase  in  the  agricultural
-wage  relative  to other  sectors. The  role  of liberalization  is  also  pointed
out  by Edwards  (1986)  to explain  the  behavior  of inter-sectoral  relative  wages
in  Chile  in the  context  of a dual  sector  model. Essentially  the  argument  is
that  rapid  public  sector  growth  in the  early  1970's  had the  effect  of pulling
up the  free  market  wage.  Liberalization  of the  protected  sector  following  the
fall  of the  Allende  Government  then  had the  effect  of further  expanding  the
wage differential,  likely  due  to  high  urban  unemployment.  Devaluation  of the
exchange  rate  is important  to explain  the  reduction  in the  wage differential
in the  19808.
Some  puzzles  nevertheless,  remain. For  example,  the  growth  in
agriculture  in  Kenya  has  not lagged  much  behind  that  of  GDP;  yet, in the
absence  of any  discernible  change  in institutional  wage-setting  policies,  the
agriculture-construction  wage ratio  rose  during  1974/80  as economic  growth
slowed,  then fell  again  during  1980/84  as it slowed  down  even  further.
Similarly,  we have  no full  explanation  of the  observed  relative  wage trend  in
Uruguay,  although  the slower  decline  in  the  demand  for  agricultural  labor
during  1980/84  is consistent  with the  increase  in the  relative  agricultural
wage during  the  period.
The  evidence  presented  in  Table  5 and  the  various  studies  suggests,
however,  that  intersectoral  wage differentials  do respond  to the  forces  of
supply  and  demand  in  a fashion  consistent  with imperfect  labor  mobility
between  sectors. This is  also  reflected  in  overviews  on countries  for  which- 27 -
we cannot  present  relative  wage series. In particular,  the  overviews  for
Brazil,  Colombia,  Egypt  and  Peru  all  argue  that  intersectoral  differentials
respond  in a  more  or less  traditional  way to supply  and  demand  disturbances.
This  is  not to suggest,  however,  that  intersectoral  shifts  always  operate
smoothly. Riveros  (1986)  finds  evidence  for  example,  that  sectoral  shifts
between  urban  tradables  and  nontradables  sectors  in  Chile  during  the  mid-
1970's  were subject  to sufficient  friction  so  as to significantly  increase
structural  unemployment.
The  essential  point  is,  however,  that  structural  adjustment  policies
aimed  at reallocating  labor  between  at least  rural  and  urban  areas  should
allow  for  a consequent  rise  in  the  wage  paid in expanding  sectors. In the
extreme,  where labor  markets  are  totally  segmented  this  will act  as a real
obstacle  to the success  of such  policies. There  is little  evidence  for  this,
however,  with respect  to unskilled  labor  anywhere  in the  overviews. The  main
qualification  to these  arguments  arises  when it is desired  to  expand  sectors
covered  by  wage-supporting  regulations  as such  expansion  should  be possible
without  any  further  need  to raise  wages.
4.4.3 Real  Product  Wages
As noted  earlier,  exogenous  shocks  such  as changes  in terms  of trade,
tariff  adjustment  and  exchange  rate  adjustment  are  all  expected  to influence
equilibrium  employment  levels  in different  sectors  through  changes  in real
product  wages.  The  annual  rates  of  change  in  the  latter  are  given,  where
possible,  in  Table  6 for  agriculture,  manufacturing  and  construction  for  the
three  periods  examined  (Table  6).
It is reasonably  clear  that  historically,  the  movement  of real
product  wages  has  not  been dominated  by a causal  process  in  which  changes  in
tradable  goods  prices  lead  to  changes  in real  product  wages in  the  opposite- 28 -
direction  in tradables  producing  sectors. In fact,  the  data  presented  in
Table  6 suggest  that  the  changes  in  real  product  wages in  agriculture  relative
to those  in other  sectors  almost  always  move in the  same  direction  as the  wage
ratios  presented  in  Table  5.  This  would suggest  alternative  explanations.
One is that  institutional  determination  of  wage levels  may  have  been
important. Another  is that  changes  in the  sectoral  composition  of labor
demand  are  more related  to  adjustments  in quantity  constraints  on product
supply  or changes  in  non-labor  input  prices,  than  to exogenous  price  shocks.
S.  Institutional  Aspects  of  Labor  Markets
There  can  be  no question  that  labor  markets  in  LDC's  have  at various
times  been subject  to a  wide range  of institutional  influences  related  to the
practice  of certain  labor  standards. 13 Such  influences  include  government
regulations  regarding  pay  and  other  employment  conditions  in  the  private
sector,  public  sector  pay  and  employment  policies,  and  the  labor  market  impact
of regulations  on job security  and  non-wage  costs  of labor. These  policies
and  labor  market  institutions  are  important  in  a macro-context  in terms  of
their  potential  implications  for  stabilization  and  exchange  rate  policies 14
and  in a  micro-context  for  their  effects  upon the  efficiency  of resource
allocation.  We review  the  evidence  on each  type  of policy  over  the  rest  of
this  section.
5.1  Wage Policies
These  are  essentially  of two  types:  minimum  wages (MW)  regulations
and  income  policies. The  two  differ  in that  the former  only  regulate  the
wages  of the  lowest  paid  while  the  latter  represents  an attempt  to control  the
pay  structure  as a  whole  through  government  guidelines  and  direct  intervention- 29  -
in collective  bargaining.  As income  policies  are  generally  rarer  in  LDC's 15
our  discussion  concentrates  mostly  upon the  evidence  regarding  MWs.
The  main expected  effects  of an  effective  MW policy  are:
(i)  If such  policies  lead  to economy-wide  real  wage indexation,  then
nominal  exchange  rate  adjustment  may be  unable  to  change  the real
exchange  rate,  while  expenditure  reducing  policies  directed  at
improving  an existing  current  account  deficit  may only  do so  by
increasing  unemployment.
(ii) An effective  economy-wide  MW will create  unemployment.  If,  more
realistically,  such  regulations  only  apply  to a particular  sector
(i.e.  the  modern  or  covered  sector),  then  employment  in that  sector
is likely  to fall,  labor  supply  in total  will increase,  and  one  would
expect  some  combination  of increased  informal  sector  employment  at a
lower  wage,  increased  unemployment  and  quasi-voluntary  unemployment.
These  effects  are  analyzed  in  Mincer  (1976)  and in  Lopez  &  Riveros
(1989). Effective  minimum  wages  thus  lead  to  efficiency  losses  both
through  higher  unemployment  and  through  the  fact  that  marginal  rates
of substitution  between  inputs  diverge  across  sectors.
(iii)  The  imposition  of  an effective  MW may  be expected  to raise  the  real
exchange  rate,  defined  here  according  to the  price  of  nontradables
relative  to that  of tradables,  as formal  nontradables-producing
sectors  will find  it easier  to pass  the  wage increase  on in the  form
of  higher  prices  than  tradables-producing  sectors.
(iv) MWs should  normally  lead  to a  compression  of skill  differentials
between  skilled  and  unskilled  labor. If  however,  wage  differentials
are  maintained  by collective  bargaining,  the  employment  levels  of
both  skilled  and  unskilled  workers  may fall  within  the  modern  sector.- 30 -
In general,  an increase  in  MWs is  expected  to increase  the  relative
share  of the  unskilled  in total  unemployment.
(v)  Employers  may  become  less  willing  to offer  specific  training  if they
find  it less  profitable  to allow  wages  to rise  with experience
(Collier  and  Lal (1986)].
(vi) Indexed  MWs exert  an  upward  pressure  on  nominal  average  wages  and
hence  inflation,  thus  being  a potential  source  of  macroeconomic
instability  (Paldan  and  Riveros  (1987)].
The  problems  in  assessing  the  impact  of  MWs are  well  known. One
difficulty  is that  simple  comparisons  between  unskilled  and  minimum  rates  are
hard  to interpret  as average  unskilled  rates  will generally  be above  the
latter  even if  the  minimum  rate  has raised  wages  at the  lower  tail  of the
distribution.  Usually,  however,  one  can  judge  a  minimum  rate  as ineffective
if the  gap  between  actual  and  minimum  rates  is large  enough  and  this  is indeed
the  implicit  procedure  followed  in  most  of the  country  studies. Nor can  the
presence  of surplus  unskilled  labor  be taken  as  a definite  indicator,  as it
may  be that  an efficiency  as opposed  to a  market-clearing  wage  would  prevail
in  the  absence  of  MW legislation.  On the  other  hand,  the  effect  of MWs in
creating  both  discouraged  workers  and  open  unemployment  is  normally  overlooked
when  making  simple  statistical  comparisons  [Riveros  & Paredes  (1988)].
Finally,  there  is also  the  question  of the  direction  of causality  between  MWs
and  average  wages  and  inflation. In India,  for  example,  it is  generally
believed  that  minimum  wage setting  bodies  simply  fix  the  minimum  at around  the
lower  end  of rates  actually  being  paid.  Paldam  & Riveros  (1987)  have employed
statistical  causality  tests  to  minimum  and  average  wage series  for  six  Latin
American  countries. They  conclude  that  there  prevails  a  weak  causality  from
MW's to average  wages  in  Argentina  and  Peru  while  the  link  is  much stronger  in
Chile,  Colombia  and  Mexico.- 31 -
Two  central  points  emerge  very  clearly  irom  a review  of country
studies. First,  that  the  aggressiveness  of  MW policies  has  clearly  been
declining  over  time.  This  is strongly  suggested  by Fallon  & Riveros  (1986)
and  Schultz  (1987)  who both  show  that  MWs  have  been declining  relative  to
agricultural  labor  productivity  since  the  mid-1960's  over  a  wide range  of
LDC's. Other  measures  such  as the  minimum  to  average  wage ratio  display  a
similar  trend [Starr  (1981)]. Second,  that  it is  only in  a few  countries
where  MWs have recently  been  set  at anything  like  effective  levels. Here
recent  examples  include  Argentina  and  Zimbabwe,  although  there  is  evidence  of
effective  minima  in  Chile,  Kenya,  Tunisia  and  possibly  the  Philippines  in
earlier  years. It also  appears  that  MW's  have  been set  at effective  levels  in
Peru,  although  Suarez  (1987)  shows  that  enforcement  was  clearly  less  than
universal  as a sizable  proportion  of  wage  employees  (30Z)  received  wages  below
the  minimum.
The  macroeconomic  effects  of  minimum  wage  policies  are  most fully
addressed  in the  overview  on  Argentina  by Sanchez  (1987),  although  wage
support  in  Argentina  used  a  wider  range  of instruments  than  MW's.
Essentially,  the results  of the  high  wage to exchange  rate  policy  were exactly
as expected  --  prices  in the  import-competing  industries  were  maintained  by
trade  policies  such  as tariffs. Sanchez  argues  that  the  high  wage to exchange
rate  policies  has seriously  distorted  the  composition  of production  within  the
economy  towards  the  nontradables  sector. Unemployment  has  not,  however,  been
a serious  problem  in  Argentina,  partly  because  of  public  sector  growth  and
partly  because  labor  supply  has  not  been  growing  as  quickly  as in other  LDC's
given  an aging  population.  An opposite  argument  is that  provided  by Solimano
(1987)  with regard  to Chile,  where  he concluded  in the  existence  of a
significant  positive  effect  of  MWs  on aggregate  demand  and  output.- 32 -
The  impact  of MWs  upon  employment  levels  is  most thoroughly
investigated  in the  overview  on Zimbabwe  by Fallon  (1987b). Shortly  after
independence  in 1980,  the  government  introduced  a  MW with  virtually  universal
coverage. By  projecting  forward  a  wage equation  fitted  over  earlier  years,
the  author  was able  to compare  actual  with  predicted  wage rates  during  the
1980's:  the  difference  between  the  two  being  a  measure  of the  wage-raising
effect  of the  minimum  wage  policy. As expected,  the sectors  most affected
were those  with  proportionately  the  most  unskilled  labor,  i.e.  agriculture,
mining  and  domestic  servants  --  agriculture  showing  a 422  difference  between
the  actual  and  the  expected  wage  when the  policy  was at its  most aggressive  in
1982. Nevertheless,  with the  exception  of financial  services  and, rather
surprisingly,  construction,  all  sectors  experienced  a  proportionate  wage
deviation  of 15Z  or  more.  However,  when the  employment  effects  of the  policy
were calculated  using  estimated  labor  demand  functions,  it  was only in
agriculture  that  a substantial  employment  decrease  of about  182  could  be
attributed.  In the  modern  sector  as a  whole,  the  estimated  wage-raising
effect  of 172  only  translated  into  an employment  reduction  of around  4Z.  In
almost  all sectors,  however,  the  estimated  labor  demand  equations  indicated
far  from  perfect  employment  adjustment  over  a one  year  period,  thus  suggesting
that  in Zimbabwe  at least, 16 the  employment  effects  of a  MW policy  are  likely
to be spread  over several  years.
There  is little  evidence  of the  effects  of  MW policies  upon  wage
differentials  by skill. Macedo  (1985)  discounts  MW policies  as the  cause  of
narrowing  skill  differentials  in  Brazil  between  1973  and  1984.  In  common  with
most  other  discussions  of skill  differentials  in the  overview  series,  he
attributed  their  movement  over  time  to simple  supply  and  demand  effects:  the
unskilled  wage being  set  by an approximately  perfectly  elastic  supply  of
unskilled  workers  while  the  skilled  wage fell  given  faster  growth  of skilled- 33 -
workers  relative  to demand. Paldam  &  Riveros  (1987)  also  failed  to find  any
evidence  that  MH's  had  any  significant  effect  in compressing  the  wage
structure  in some  Latin  American  countries. Zimbabwe,  however,  presents  a
rather  different  case in  that  since  the  beginning  of 1982  the  government  has
introduced  a graduated  scale  of  permitted  wage increase  which allows
progressively  smaller  pay raises  for  those  higher  up the  wage ladder. When
taken  in conjunction  with the  minimum  wage  policy  this  should  have led  to an
ongoing  compression  of  wage differentia.'s  over  time. Although  these  effects
were clearly  evident  in  the  public  sector,  it  appeared  that  up to 1985,
private  sector  employers  had  managed  to  circumvent  the  salary  controls  by
suitable  job redefinition.  This  does  indicate,  however,  that  skilled  workers
are  not in excess  supply  in Zimbabwe  --  a theme  that  is consistently  repeated
throughout  several  country  studies.
5.2  Public  Sector  Pay  and  Employment  Policies
The  public  sector  --  here  defined  as central  government,  local
government  and  parastatals  --  accounts  for  a sizable  share  of total  non-
agricultural  employment  in  most LDC's. Among  the  countries  in our  sample  this
proportion  is at its  lowest  (16Z)  in South  Korea  and  at its  highest  (85?  and
81?)  in Sudan  and  Zambia  respectively.  In  most countries,  central  and local
government  account  for  the  bulk  of the  total,  Sri  Lanka  is  one  notable
exception.
None of this  would  be of any  special  relevance  if  public  sector  pay
were determined  by labor  market  forces  and  public  sector  employment  according
to cost-minimizing  objectives  based  upon  appropriate  shadow  prices. The
problem  is,  however,  that  historical  experience  indicates  that  they  are  not.
There  is clear  evidence  that  public  sector  wages  have been  set  at  various- 34 -
times  both  above  and  below  those  in the  private  sector,  while  employment
levels  have been  influenced  by non-economic  objectives.
Assuming  that  it is  possible  to impute  appropriate  social  valuations
to different  government  services,  then  two  main distortions  may arise  if
governments  set  public  sector  wage and  employment  policies  according  to non-
economic  objectives  --  namely  a  wage rate  and  a  marginal  social  value  product
not equal  to those  elsewhere. The  essential  point  here  is that  if the
government  follows  a decision  rule  based  upon,  for  example,  a fixed  budget
constraint,  then  wage rates  and  marginal  social  value  products  will  not  be
equated  in the  public  sector. Thus  for  example,  setting  public  sector  wages
equal  to those  in the  private  sector  will  not  automatically  equate  marginal
value  products  in the  two  sectors.
Two  cases  may  briefly  illustrate  this. In the  first  case,  suppose
that  the  public  sector  wage is  equated  to that  in  the  rest  of the  modern
sector  but  that  its  marginal  value  product  is lower. The  obvious  remedy  would
be for  the  government  to cut  its  employment  levels  thus  permitting  a transfer
of labor  to the  sector  with the  higher  marginal  productivity.  Given  a fixed
budget  constraint 17 this  may permit,  however,  a  higher  public  sector  wage thus
exacerbating  any  existing  problem  of excess  labor  supply. The  other  and  more
typical  case  is  where  wishing  to reduce  expenditure,  the  government  cuts  wages
while  maintaining  employment  levels. If  public  sector  wages  were initially
above  those  in the  private  modern  sector,  then  this  will have  the  beneficial
effect  of reducing  excess  labor  supply. If,  however,  wages fall  below  those
in the  private  sector  then  morale  aud  general  staffing  problems  are likely  to
be observed  among  public  sector  employees.
There  is  a distinct  pattern  to the  recent  evolution  of public  sector
wage and  employment  policies  in some  of the  countries  in our  sample. This is
observed  essentially  in those  countries  which  have attempted  to reduce  public- 35 -
expenditure  in the  fact  of  balance  of payments  difficulties.  Our conclusions
here are  essentially  the  same  as those  drawn  earlier  by Lindauer,  Meesook  and
Subsaeng  (1988)  in relation  to a  number  of  African  countries,  namely:
(i)  The real  value  of public  sector  wage rates  has  fallen  dramatically
over  the  past  decade. This  is  perhaps  seen  most clearly  in the  case
of Sudan  where  the  real  wage of an  unskilled  worker  in the  public
sector  more than  halved  between  1975  and  1982. Substantial  real  wage
decreases  are  reported  in  the  overviews  for  the  Philippines  and
Zambia,  while substantial  declines  have  been reported  elsewhere  by
Lindauer  et.al.  (1988).
(ii) There  has  been  a systematic  compression  in  wage  differentials  within
the  public  sector  over  the  same  period. In Sudan,  for  example,  the
pay differential  between  a deputy  undersecretary  and  an unskilled
worker  has  more than  halved  since  1975.  This  pattern  has  been
repeated  elsewhere  in sub-Saharan  Africa,  and  in the  Philippines.
(iii)  Public/private  sector  wage differentials  have certainly  narrowed
considerably  over  the  years  and  private  sector  employees  are  now
typically  better  paid.  This  is,  for  instance,  evidenced  in  many
Latin  American  countries,  like  Uruguay,  Mexico  and  Argentina.
(iv) Public  sector  employment  has  usually  been  growing  faster  than  that  of
the  private  sector  as, for  instance  in  Mexico. Public  sector
expenditure  cuts  usually  have  relied  therefore  exclusively  on  pay as
opposed  to employment  reductions.
The  main  consequences  of these  policies  in the  countries  affected
seem  to  have  been  much  as expected. Where  alternative  job  possibilities  exist
as in Sudan  where  positions  abroad  are  available  for  some  classes  of  workers,
there  is  evidence  of increased  voluntary  turnover  from  the  public  sector  thus
leading  to shortages  of certain  types  of skilled  labor. Casual  evidence- 36 -
suggests  that  moonlighting  is common  in some  countries  in sub-Saharan  Africa,
although  given  the  low  level  of efficiency  now  prevailing  in the  public  sector
throughout  much of the  region,  this  presumably  improves  sectoral  labor
allocation.
This  pattern  typically  has  not  been  observed  in  countries  facing  less
daunting  economic  circumstances.  There  is  certainly  no clear  presumption
regarding  the  sign  of the  public/private  wage differentials:  wages  being  above
those  in the  private  sector  in  Indonesia  and  about  the  same  in Sri  Lanka.
Both  of these  comparisons  are  based,  however,  upon  wages  of roughly  comparable
worker  grades  rather  than  upon  estimated  earnings  functions.  Analyses  of the
latter  type  do  not find  a consistent  pattern  acrnss  different  countries.
Similarly,  although  overstaffing  is  a key  feature  of the  public  sector  in
Egypt,  this  is  much less  pronounced  in  South  Asian  countries  such  as India  or
Sri  Lanka.
5.1.3  Job  Security  Regulations
In general,  there  are three  relevant  aspects  of job  security
regulation  (JSR)  regarding  its  actual  effect:  (a)  the  period  of  notice
required;  (b)  the  formula  by which  compensation  for  non-disciplinary  dismissal
is determined  and; (c)  government  permission  requirements.  The  main
anticipated  effects  of increased  dismissal  costs  imposed  through  any
combination  of these  three  mechanisms  are:
(i)  Individual  worker  productivity  may  be impaired  because  of less  worker
effort,  greater  cost  of dismissing  recently  hired  workers  who  prove
unsatisfactory  and  a greater  use  of temporary  labor. For  given  wage
levels,  the  cost  per  efficiency  unit  of labor  is increased  thus
giving  firms  an incentive  to adopt  more  capital  inteasive  techniques.
Thus  although  initially  JSR  may  have employment  preserving  effects,- 37 -
employment  levels  may fall  below  their  pre-JSR  desired  levels  as
firms  hire fewer  workers.
(ii) Firms  will become  less  flexible  in  their  adjustment  to  changing
market  conditions. This  may apply  to both  employment  and  output
levels.
(iii)  Wage rates  may fall  as greater  job  security  is imposed  upon
employment  contracts. If.  however,  the  original  contracts  were
optimal, 18 then  the imposition  of additional  job  security  will reduce
profit  levels.
Riveros  (1988d)  has reviewed  JSR  in a large  number  of  LDCs lending
particular  attention  to the  enforcement  of the  three  aspects  mentioned  above.
He produces  a ranking  in  which  Argentina,  Colombia,  Mexico,  Portugal,  Greece
and  India  are  the  countries  identified  with heaviest  JSR.  The  opposite  is
found  in  Korea,  Hong  Kong,  Singapore  and  Nigeria. In general,  there  appears
to  exist  a  high correlation  between  highly  export-oriented  economies  and
existence  of light  JSR.
The  effects  of JSR  are  reviewed  to some  degree  or another  in the
cases  of Brazil,  Chile,  India,  Peru,  Mexico,  Sudan  and  Zimbabwe. Tough  JSRs
are  not,  of course,  confined  exclusively  to these  countries  and  have emerged
in  other  parts  of Latin  America  and  in  both  Western  and  Eastern  Europe.
In terms  of the  regulations  employed  these  appear  to  have  varied
considerably  across  countries. In Sudan  legal  compensation  is six  months'  pay
plus  one  month's  paid  notice  unless  the  employer  can  satisfy  the  authorities
that  the  worker  has committed  one  or  more from  the  series  of prescribed
offenses. In  Mexico,  the  total  compensation  is  three  months  plus  about  a
month  per  year  of service. In India  the  worker  is entitled  to  one  month's
notice  in  writing  and  fifteen  days'  compensation  for  each  year  of service. In- 38 -
contrast,  in Zimbabwe  the  worker  is entitled  to only  between  one  day  and  one
month's  pay  as compensation  and  the  same  period  of  notice,  the  period  being
determined  by the  pay interval  and  the  worker's  length  of service. Both India
and  Zimbabwe  have recently  experienced,  however,  the  introduction  of the  need
for  employers  to obtain  government  permission  prior  to retrenching  or laying-
off  permanent  workers. In India  this  regulation  applied  between  1976  and  1982
to all  manufacturing  and  mining  establishments  employing  three  hundred  or  more
workers  and  has applied  since  1984  to all  establishments  in  the same  sectors
employing  one  hundred  or more  workers. In Zimbabwe,  every  undertaking,
industry,  trade  or occupation  is  covered  by the  regulations  with a few,  very
minor  exceptions.  Both  Brazil  and  Chile  present  examples  of countries  in
which  JSR  was alleviated.  In both  cases,  the  authors  (Brazil  - Hacedo  (1986)
and  Chile  - Riveros  (1986)]  argue  that  th'e  effect  of the  deregulation  was to
allow  firms  to  adjust  manning  levels  given  changing  levels  of  wage indexation.
This  is the  precise  opposite  of  what  happoned  in Zimbabwe,  where  JSR  was
introduced  to  prevent  employers  from  reducing  their  work forces  in  the face  of
higher  minimum  wages.  In  Chile,  however,  Riveros  notes  that  given
uncertainties  about  the  future  state  of job  tenure  laws,  employers  displayed  a
reluctance  to hire  during  the  1973/79  period  and  tended  to adopt  labor  saving
technologies.
Fieldwork  carried  out  in relation  to the  effects  of the  JSR in India
and  Zimbabwe  indicated  that  employers  were increasingly  reluctant  to  hire
workers. In  India,  the  option  of taking  on temporary  staff  was generally  not
viable,  partly  because  of restrictions  imposed  by other  existing  labor  laws
and  partly  because  the  use  of temporary  labor  is  hotly  opposed  by trade
unions. Employers  in beth  countries  indicated  a greater  willingness  to  employ
more  capital  intensive  techniques  although  opportunities  for  this  are,  at
present,  limited  in  some  sectors  in Zimbabwe  because  of currently  tight- 39 -
foreign  exchange  availability.  There  was also  evidence  in  India  of firms
resorting  to illegal  closures  and  delaying  subsequent  legal  proceedings  while
gambling  on the  serious  possibility  of the  existing  law  being  declared
unconstitutional.
Suarez  (1987)  is largely  ambivalent  about  the  effects  of  JSR in Peru.
There  does seem  to be evidence,  however,  that  JSR  has led  to an increased
tendency  to use  temporary  workers  and  may  have  hampered  attempts  at
liberalization  by reducing  labor  mobility. Similarly,  JSR in  Mexico  have  been
an important  stumbling  block  for  the  success  of the  industrial  restructuring
derived  from  the  opening  up of the  economy  tRiveros  (1988c)]. Likewise,  the
effect  of substantial  financial  contributi.ons  to a severance  payments  fund,
has significantly  increased  the  non-wage  cost  of labor  in  Colombia,  thus
harming  employment  growth.
Another  institutional  labor  market  aspect  refers  to  non-wage  cost
regulations  (NWC),  such  as fringe  benefits,  medical  insurances,  social
security  contributions,  bonuses,  etc. Riveros  (1988d)  has  studied  this  issue
in  21  LDCB,  the  main  conclusion  being  that  governments  have  not  attempted  to
furthez  intensify  such  regulations  during  the  late  1970s  and  the  1980s. In
general,  and  despite  the  wide  dispersion  seen  across  countries,  the  distortive
effect of NWC --  as measured against the per-capita income --  has tended to
diminish  in  time (Table  7),  the  only  exception  to this  pattern  being  Colombia.
This  is also  complemented  by evidence  indicating  that  total  unit  cost  of labor
have  also  generally  decreased  during  the  1980s. Hence,  as in  the  case  of  MW
regulations,  the  evidence  seems  to ind 4.cate  the  existence  of a deregulatory
trend  through  time  across  LDCs.
6.  Conclusions
There  seem  to be five  main conclusions  that  emerge  from  this  survey:- 40 -
(i)  Shifts  in labor  allocation  across  sectors  in the  light  of
macroeconomic  policy  change  and  changes  in the  external  environment
are  much as those  predicted  by standard  theory. The  general  pattern
here is that  labor  has  been  increasingly  deployed  in  nontradables  and
import-competing  sectors. There  is little  evidence  that  geographical
immobility  of unskilled  or clerical  labor  constitutes  a serious
barrier  to the  achievement  of  macro  strategy. However,  problems  of
mobility  between  urban  tradables  and  nontradables  are  reported,  while
shortages  of trained  manpower  are  common  in  most countries. The
actual  role  of urban  labor  market  segmentation  in  making  the  process
of adjustment  difficult  is  an issue  deserving  more applied  research.
(ii) Both  real  consumption  wages  and  intersectoral  wage differentials  have
behaved  also  as suggested  by standard  theory  in  country  and  over  time
periods  where  the  effects  of institutional  wage intervention  could  be
regarded  as unimportant.  There  is little  direct  evidence  of real
wage resistance  in  the  absence  of institutionalized  wage indexation
--  as  would  be suggested  by various  versions  of efficiency  wage
theories. However,  this  subject  could  certainly  bear  more
investigation.  Wage  differentials  have  tended  to  widen  in favor  of
expanding  sectors,  thus  suggesting  less  than  perfect  labor  mobility.
(iii)  Traditional  methods  of  wage support  such  as  minimum  wage policies  and
non-wage  cost regulations  have  generally  become  less  important  over
the  last  two  decades. Where  effective  minimum  wage policies  are  or
have  been  present,  they  have  nevertheless  had  the  expected
distortionary  effects.
(iv) This  review  has supported  and  further  underlined  previous  concern
regarding  recent  trends  in  public  sector  pay and  employment  policies
in sub-Saharan  Africa. There  seems  little  doubt  that  public/private- 41 -
sector  wage differentials  are  being  allowed  to  widen  with adverse
consequences  for  public  sector  efficiency.
(v)  Job security  regulations  may  present  a definite  obstacle  to
structural  adjustment  programs  insofar  as they  hinder  the  release  of
labor  from  contracting  sectors. It is  plausible  that  regulations  of
this  kind  would  becowt  more commonplace  as governments  seek  to  offset
the  employment-reducing  effects  of the  recession.  However,  no clear
international  trend  in  this  direct 4on can,  as yet,  be discerned.- 42 -
ENDNOTES
1  These  country  studies  were  prepared  between  1985  and  1987,  and  they  all
remain  unpublished. The  countries  covered  are: (Africa)  - Egypt,  Kenya,
Nigeria,  Sudan,  Tanzania,  Tunisia,  Zambia  and Zimbabwe;  (Asia)  - India,
Indonesia,  Israel,  Pakistan,  Philippines,  South  Korea,  and  Sri  Lanka;
(Latin  America)  - Argentina,  Bolivia,  Brazil,  Chile,  Colombia,  Mexico,
Peru  and  Uruguay.
2  This  model is  developed  in  Edwards  (1988). We discuss  later  the  effects
of relaxing  some  of the  basic  assumptions  made for  this  presentation.
3  Origins  of those  models  are  found  in  Meade (1951)  and  Edgren,  et.al.
(1969). Aukurst  (1977),  Calmfors  (1977)  and  Lindbeck  (1979)  developed
the 'Scandinavian'  version. Standard  expositions  of this  model  are
given  by Prachowny  (1984),  Bruno  (1976)  and  Corden  (1977).
4  As the  tradables  sectors  may  produce  a  wide range  of  products  with a
wide range  of relative  labor  intensities,  it  would  be unwise  to
generalize  about  which  of the  tradables  or  nontradables  sectors  is the
more labor  intensive.
5  This is  obviously  a restatement  of the standard  argument  that  an
expenditure  switching  policy  must  be combined  with an expenditure
reducing  policy  given  full  employment.  Here  we are  assuming  that
contractionary  effects  of a devaluation  are  relatively  small. Examples
of such  effects  are  a real  balance  effect  arising  from  a reduced  value
of liquid  assets,  redistribution  towards  groups  with a  higher  marginal
savings  propensity  and  reduced  spending  given  higher  nominal  external
debt in  domestic  currency.
6  It should  be noted,  however,  that  as female  participation  rates  are
everywhere  less  than  those  of  males,  their  movements  often  exert  only  a
minor  influence  upon  the  total  labor  force  participation  rate  as a
whole.
7  Although  employment  information  is  available  for  most of the  other
countries  in  the sample,  this  is restricted  either  to  modern  sector  wage
employment  or to  urban  areas.
8  Evidence  on  manufacturing  employment  trends  for  various  LDCs  indicates
that  employment  absorption  has  been  low  and  even  negative  in some
countries  especially  in  Latin  America.
9  We may  note that  the  coverage  criterion  is  not a  necessary  condition  for
labor-market  dualism. For  example,  if  efficiency  wage  considerations
apply  differentially  across  sectors  due  top  differences  in specific
training  costs  then  intersectoral  wage gaps  will appear  that  cannot  be
eliminated  by  market  forces. See,  for  example,  Stiglitz  (1973).
10  Nevertheless,  the  observation  that  the  participation  rate  declines  in
the face  of reduced  job-finding  probabilities  in  the  modern  sector  and- 43 -
falling  informal  sector  wages is  fully  consistent  with the  predictions
of standard  models  in  the literature  such  as that  of  Mincer  (1976).
11  Official  government  estimates  claim  that  unemployment  rates  among  young
people  are  of the  order  of 60Z  or above. These  estimates  appear,
however,  to  be derived  residually  by subtracting  urban  modern  sector
employment  from  estimated  urban  labor  force.
12  Here  we assume  that  the  difference  in the  rate  of technical  progress
between  the  agricultural  sector  and  the  rest  of the  economy  is  constant
across  different  periods.
13  There  are  various  aspects  under  the  general  concept  of labor  standards,
thus  covering  regulations  on children's  work,  right  to periodic  rest
periods,  work safety,  etc. We  will concentrate  ourselves  in  the  aspects
more relevant  to consider  the  labor  market  response  to  macro  adjustment.
14  Naturally,  all  these  labor-protective  instruments  cover  the  urban  formal
sector  of the labor  market. As often  argued,  they  usually  deal  with a
relatively  small  proportion  of the  total  employment  and  create  certain
inequitable  results  in  the  context  of macroeconomic  policies.
15  One  exception  to this  respect  is  Nigeria.
16  Labor  demand  functions  have  also  been  estimated  using  time  series  data
in other  LDC's.  These  usually  indicate  substantially  less  than  perfect
employment  adjustment.  For  other  examples  from  the  overview  series,  see
Lucas  (1985)  and  Riveros  (1988d).
17  A  detailed  analysis  of government  wage and  employment  behavior  under  a
fixed  budget  constraint  is  given  in  Lindauer  (1985).
18  Here  we refer  to an (internal)  Pareto  optimum  between  employers  and
unions  such  as,  for  example,  at a Nash  bargaining  solution. The
imposition  of greater  JSR  must therefore  lower  employer  utility  (profit)
if the  level  of  union  utility  is  at least  maintained.- 44 -
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APPENDIX
Table 1
Average Annual Percentage Growth Rata- of GNP
and Ratio of Current Account Surplus/Defik It to GNP
Growth Rates  Current Account/GNP (Z)
1966-74  1974-80  1980-87  1980  1983  1987
Egypt  2.9  9.4  5.3  -11.4  -5.2  -4.8
Kenya  7.4  5.2  2.9  -13.1  -0.8  -6.4
Nigeria  9.6  2.7  -1.9  6.8-  4.9  -1.6
Sudan  1.3  5.3  -1.4  -7.8  -6.4  -5.2
Tanzania  4.8  2.7  1.6  -1.7  -4.2  -4.5
Tunisia  6.9  6.4  3.3  -4.3  -7.4  -0.7
Zambia  3.4  0.4  -1.1  -16.8  -8.7  1.2
Zimbabwe  7.7  0.5  2.2  -5.4  -7.8  0.9
India  3.7  4.6  4.8  -1.9  -1.1  -1.5
Indonesia  8.1  7.1  4.1  4.3  -8.2  -2.8
Israel  9.2  3.6  2.0  -3.6  -7.2  -3.0
Pakistan  5.1  5.8  3.1  -3.6  -0.7  -1.0
Philippines  5.9  6.2  2.4  -5.6  -8.1  -1.6
South Korea  9.2  7.2  8.8  -8.5  -2.1  8.3
Sri Lanka  4.4  5.4  3.7  -20.7  -9.3  -5.8
Argentina  4.6  1.8  -0.4  -8.6  -4.1  -5.6
Bolivia  4.4  2.5  -2.7  -0.23  -2.3  -11.6
Brazil  10.3  6.4  3.3  -5.2  -3.5  -0.4
Chile  2.1  3.4  -0.1  -8.5  -6.2  -4.7
Colombia  6.5  4.9  2.4  -0.7  -7.9  0.8
Mexico  7.6  6.2  0.6  -5.3  3.9  2.8
Peru  4.5  2.2  1.5  -0.6  -4.6  -4.3
Uruguay  1.3  4.8  -1.8  -8.7  -1.2  -1.7
Sources:  World Tables (4th  Edition), The World Bank (1987).  World Bank Atlas,
1988, BESD.
Concepts used are: GDP at factor costs, Current  Account Balance and
GNP at market prices.- 49 -
Table  2
Terms  of  Trade  Indices,  Debtl/Exports
and  Debt  Service/Exports  Ratios
Terms  of Trade  Debt/Exports  (2)  Debt Service/
1980-100)  Exports  (2)
1970  1986  1970  1980  1987  1970  1987
Egypt  89  76  183  180  343  37  15
Kenya  92  100  80  170  342  9  34
Nigeria 2 23  44  40  32  369  7  12
Sudan 2 148  70  94  484  1562  11  7
Tunisia  64  81  164  91  182  18  26
Zambia 2 314  69  66  200  670  6  14
Zimbabwe  178  86  57  46  152  2  23
Tanzania  107  104  85  375  966  5  18
India 3 159  i.27  364  128  238  23  22
Indonesia  32  64  256  94  270  14  33
Israel  143  96  189  179  191  7  25
Pakistan 3 117  103  383  209  243  21  18
Philippines 3 176  101  113  212  318  23  25
South  Korea  161  111  146  131  72  20  27
Sri  Lanka  132  96  86  123  225  11  17
Argentina 3 139  80  241  226  661  52  521
Bolivia 3 69  46  241  260  897  13  22
Brazil 3 187  125  165  303  432  22  33
Chile 3 237  77  202  193  327  24  26
Colombia  61  98  161  117  220  19  33
Peru 3 131  66  215  207  503  40  13
Uruguay 3 197  99  104  104  256  24  26
Mexico  108  66  203  233  363  44  38
Notes:
1  Debt is  medium  and long-term  public  and  private  debt  outstanding  and
disbursed.
2  Country  rescheduled  debt.
Sourcest
World  Tables  (op.cit.),  and  Debt Tables,  1988-89  edition,  and  World
Development  Report  (1988).- 50 -
Table
Shares  of Total  Employment  by Sector,  Circa  1974  and  1985-87
Agriculture  Manufacturing  Construction  &  Services
and  Mining  Electricity,  etc.
Egypt  1974  0.48  0.15  0.03  0.34
1985  0.41  0.15  0.06  0.38
Tunisia  1975  0.39  0.17  0.10  0.32
1982  0.33  0.22  0.11  0.34
Indonesia  1976  0.66  0.07  0.02  0.25
1986  0.55  0.08  n.a.  0.37
Israel  1974  0.07  0.25  0.09  0.59
1987  0.05  0.23  0.06  0.66
Pakistan  1974  0.58  0.12  0.04  0.26
1983  0.53  0.13  0.06  0.28
Philippines  1974  0.56  0.10  0.03  0.31
1987  0.49  0.10  0.04  0.37
South  Korea  1974  0.49  0.17  0.04  0.30
1987  0.23  0.27  0.06  0.44
Bolivia  1974  0.52  0.09  0.05  0.34
1987  0.50  0.07  0.02  0.41
Brazil  1976  0.36  0.16  0.07  0.41
1986  0.26  0.16  0.08  0.50
Chile  1975  0.25  0.17  0.05  0.53
1987  0.23  0.15  0.06  0.56
Note:
Total  employment  includes  wage employment,  self-employment  and  unpaid
household  labor.
Source:
ILO  Yearbook  of  Labour  Statistics,  1988  and  various  earlier  editions.- 51  -
Table  4
Annual  Average  Percentage  Changes  in  Real  Consumption  Wages
1963-74  1974-80  1980-84  1984-87
Egypt  1.5  3.1  n.a.  n.a.
Kenya  6.1  2.4  -4.6  -4.0
Nigeria  - -1.4  -9.2  n.a.
Zambia  1.8  -1.1  -10.0  n.a.
Zimbabwe  2.1  1.2  2.7  9.5*
Tanzania  -1.6  -5.5  2.8  n.a.
India  -4.1  0.8  2.6  n.a.
Israel  1.7  1.5  6.9
Pakistan  2.2  1.9  5.8  n.a.
South  Korea  6.8  13.3  1.8  3.2
Sri  Lanka  1.8  4.0  -6.1  5.8
Argentina  0.6  -4.2  2.9  -8.8**
Brazil  n.a.  3.5  1.3  n.a.
Chile  1.9  9.9  -0.7  -3.6
Colombia  0.1  1.9  3.7  0.4
Mexico  n.a.  0.5  -2.0  -3.9*
Peru  0.6  -3.5  -8.6  10.4
Uruguay  0.4  -4.3  -4.1  4.5
Notes:
Latin  American  countries  (1974-1980):  average  manufacturing  sector  wages
deflated  by CPI.  Other  countriess  wage of construction  workers  deflated
by CPI.  For  1984-87,  Argentina  and  Colombiat  average  manufacturing  sector




Latin  American  Countries:  data  taken  from  Riveros  (1980c). Other
countries  and  years:  ILO  Yearbook  of  Labour  Statistics,  1987  and  various
issues.- 52 -
Table S
Relative Wage Rates (1965-100)
1965  1974  1980  1984  1986
Kenya  A/H  100  67.3  89.1  80.3  74.7
A/C  100  81.1  107.2  96.7  92.5
Zambia  A/H  100  113.4  137.5  146.4  n.a.
A/C  100  108.3  120.2  115.8  n.a.
ZimbabwA  A/H  100  79.9  84.1  118.8  n.a.
A/C  100  81.0  89.3  119.4  n.a.
India  A/H  100  60.8  62.4  64.1  n.a.
Pakistan  A/M  100  130.1  138.3  252.5  n.a.
South Korea  A/H  100  78.6  92.3  77.5  71.7
A/C  100  94.9  92.4  87.8  n.a.
Sri Lanka  A/H  100  94.9  118.0  124.2  136.6
A/C  100  83.7  107.4  108.0  61.5
Chile  A/M  100  113.2  122.8  92.0  84.6
Uruguay1 A/H  100  122.5  95.5  92.7  86.4
A/C  100  183.7  156.5  258.7  276.1
Notes:
A/M - Agricultural wage relative to manufacturing wage.
A/C - Agricultural wage relative to construction  wag3.
For India and Pakistan the figures for 1974 correspond to 1975.
1  For Uruguay, data was taken from Central Bank of Uruguay;
agricultural wage - minimum wage, manufacturing wage - skilled  wage,
and construction wage - unskilled wage.
Sources:
Calculated from data taken from Bose (1980),  Riveros (1988d),  and ILO
Yearbook of Labour Statistics (various issues).- 53 -
Table  6
Annual  Percentage  Change  in  Real  Product  Wage
1965/74  1974/80  1980/84  1985-87*
Kenya  A  1.2  3.9  -6.7  7.1
M  3.0  1.5  -8.3  4.3
C  5.1  2.8  -8.3  -3.5
Zambia  A  n.a.  3.1  -5.7  n.a.
M  n.a.  -2.6  -9.0  n.a.
C  n.a.  -10.6  -1.9  n.a.
Zimbabwe  A  -1.0  5.0  17.3  n.a.
M  1.5  2.0  -1.0  n.a.
C  0.3  -1.2  -11.5  n.a.
India  A  -2.6  4.4  6.7  n.a.
M  -1.9  -1.0  2.8  n.a.
Pakistan  A  8.4  -1.8  23.9  n.a.
M  1.2  -1.4  -4.4  n.a.
South  Korea  A  2.0  9.9  3.3  6.2
M  2.5  11.7  7.8  10.8
C  4.0  4.3  5.4
Sri  Lanka  A  -3.9  7.1  -7.1  -4.7
M  -1.9  1.5  -5.1  2.9
C  2.3  10.7
Chile  A  -0.8  0.8  -1.2  -3.6
M  -8.2  15.8  14.0  1.9
Uruguay  A  4.4  3.9  -0.2  2.2
M  -13.1  -9.2  -9.3  9.7
C  -11.5  -3.8  -1.1  -4.2
Notes:
1  A - Agriculture, M - Manufacturing, C - Construction
2  Value  added  deflators  taken  from  national  accounts.
3  For  Kenya  1985-87,  deflatoL  is  CPI.
*  1986  and  1987  figures  used  when available.
Sources:
Wage data  from  Bose (1981)  and  ILO  Yearbook  of Labour  Statistics  1987.
Deflators  from  World  Bank  Tables  (3rd  edition)  and  UN National  Account
Statistics:  Main  Aggregates  and  Detailed  Tables  1984.
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